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THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER
ARBITRATION IN LIGHT OF STOLT-

NIELSEN
Terry F. Moritz & Brandon J. Fitch*

In

I. Overview - The UnderlyingPolicy Issues

Concepcion,' the Supreme Court is poised to decide whether
a judicially crafted California rule that serves to invalidate an
arbitration class-action waiver as unconscionable is in conflict
with the Federal Arbitration Act and therefore ineffective.2 In
deciding this case, the Court is presented with several significant
policy conflicts, as is evidenced by the filing of fifteen Amicus
Curiaebriefs for the Respondent and eleven Amicus Curiae briefs
for the Petitioner. -Collectively, the Amici represent a broad
spectrum of academic, economic, and social interests. At its core,
the case presents the question of whether consumers and the
businesses that serve them will continue to have access to
arbitration in order to resolve individual disputes arising out of
the numerous services that businesses provide consumers under
standard form consumer agreements. Many of these contracts are
designed to resolve individual disputes between business
enterprises and consumers through arbitration. However, the
contracts explicitly exclude, or require the waiver of, the
consumer's participation in class action arbitrations. These
* Terry F. Moritz is a senior partner at Goldberg Kohn Ltd. in Chicago,
Illinois. Mr. Moritz founded and chaired the firm's litigation practice for over
25 years. He is also an adjunct professor at Loyola University Chicago, School
of Law, focusing on alternative dispute resolution; Brandon J. Fitch, J.D.
Candidate, May 2011, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
'Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010).
2 If a class-waiver is held to be unconscionable, then it is severed from the
arbitration agreement, leaving an arbitration agreement silent as to classarbitration. If the class waiver is struck down and the arbitration agreement
has a blow-out clause in place, then the blow-out clause will operate to
invalidate the entire arbitration agreement.
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agreements by design preclude the use of class actions to resolve
consumer disputes under contracts that utilize arbitration to
resolve such disputes.
Several Amici for the Petitioner summarize the
fundamental policy considerations:
Many of the Chamber [of Commerce of the United
States of America's] members and affiliates regularly
employ agreements to arbitrate in their business
contracts with their customers and employees. By
agreeing to arbitrate with their counterparties, they
avoid costly and time-consuming litigation when
disputes arise. In its place, they adopt a dispute
resolution mechanism that is speedy, fair, inexpensive,
and effective. Based on the legislative policy reflected in
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and this Court's
consistent endorsement of arbitration over the past
several decades, Chamber members have structured
millions of contractual relationships around arbitration
agreements.
A. class-arbitration waiver is a key component of many
Chamber members' arbitration agreements. Decisions
like the opinion below, which invalidated a classarbitration waiver, frustrate the parties' intent,
undermine their existing agreements, and erode the
benefits offered by arbitration as an alternative to
litigation.'
Also writing in support of the Petitioner as Amici, the
Center for Class Action Fairness asserts:
First, class treatment is neither the only means nor
necessarily the best means of providing aggrieved
consumers with meaningful relief. In fact, class action
litigation suffers from several pathologies which often
make it a poor vehicle for the vindication of consumer
rights: it is expensive, raising costs to consumers in the
long-run; it is slow-moving, bringing relief, if at all, long
after class members have been harmed; even when class

Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1-2, AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893).
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plaintiffs do succeed, class members face significant
barriers to obtaining recovery; and class settlements
often are a boon for class action attorneys but a bust for
class members who recover little or nothing of value.
Second, arbitration is superior in many cases to class
actions in vindicating consumer rights. Individual
arbitration provides swift resolution of disputes; allows
for easy and complete recovery; and does not pit the
interests of consumers against an attorney tasked with
representing their interests. Indeed, consumers
consistently report that they prefer pursuing their claims
in arbitration to class 'action litigation. Therefore, both
for the individual. complainant and for aggrieved
individuals in the aggregate, a contract selecting
individual arbitration often will afford consumers a
better mechanism for obtaining meaningful relief than
class action litigation.4
The equally compelling counterpoint is made by the Amici
States of Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
Tennessee, and Vermont, and the District of Columbia:
States have long declined to enforce contracts that are
unconscionable or offensive to public policy. These and
other state law contract defenses are an important
means of protecting consumers against predatory or
unfair treatment. In urging FAA preemption of a statelaw determination that an adhesive class-action waiver
is unconscionable, petitioner asks federal courts to
second-guess decades of state contract law, without any
administrable standard to guide them. Because the
decision. below preserves States' historical ability to
develop and enforce contract law, the Amici States have
a significant interest in the outcome of this appeal.
Moreover, preempting state law here would effectively
eliminate consumer class actions, an important
complement to government efforts at safeguarding
consumers against fraudulent and deceitful practices.s
Brief of the Center for Class Action Fairness as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 3-4, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct.
3322 (2010) (No. 09-893).
1 Brief for the States of Illinois Supporting Respondents, et al. at 1, AT&T
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The Court will decide Concepcion in the context of these
policy considerations. This article will explore the Court's recent
decisions dealing with class actions in an arbitration setting and
the possible outcomes those decisions forecast. Regardless of the
Court's decision, however, the outcome will have a significant
impact on arbitration as a means of settling consumer disputes.
II. The FederalArbitrationAct
A. The principles that have developed and govern arbitration in
the United States
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allows for
enforceable arbitration agreements in contracts involving
interstate commerce or maritime transactions.6 Under the FAA,
courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their
terms.' Agreements to arbitrate are "a matter of consent, not
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as parties may limit
by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they
specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be
conducted." Doubts about the scope of arbitrable issues or the
meaning of arbitration clauses should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.9 Congress enacted the FAA to overcome judicial
hostility toward arbitration,"o and in doing so it utilized the full
extent of its Commerce Clause power."
An arbitration agreement under the FAA is "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 2 The FAA's
Section 2 savings clause "embodies the national policy favoring
arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing
with all other contracts. . ."1

Contract defenses of general

Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893).
6 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2009).
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1988).
* Id. at 479 (1989) (citations omitted).
* Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
10 Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
" See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 265-66
(1995).
" Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
13 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 443.
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applicability, such as unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening the
FAA.14 A challenge to the validity of the entire contract, as
opposed to a challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause
itself, is a question for the arbitrator, not a court."
The FAA supplants state laws that discriminate against
arbitration.' 6 States cannot require that a dispute be resolved in a
judicial forum where the parties have agreed to arbitration."
Moreover, the FAA preempts state law that undermines a
primary objective of an arbitration agreement, such as achieving
"streamlined proceedings and expeditious results."" Under the
FAA, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are valid even if the
governing state law provides that arbitration agreements are
unenforceable.
Review is very limited under the FAA, however, as "the
task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to
make public policy."20 "It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from
interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively
dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice that his decision
may be unenforceable." 2 ' At that point, the arbitrator has
exceeded his powers under section 10(a)(4) and vacatur is
proper.22 Parties cannot contract for different standards of
judicial review of an arbitration decision, governed by the FAA,
than are provided in the FAA.23
B. Stolt-Nielsen - A clear pronouncement that class actions would
not be inferred under the FAA
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held that "a party
may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class
" Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc., 513 U.S. at 281.
15 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 444.
16 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
" Id. at 10.
8 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357-358 (2008) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985)).
"See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 268.
20 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767
(2010).
21 Id. at 1767 (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass'n. v. Garvey,
532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 1780.
23 Hall St. Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
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arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that
the party agreed to do so.""

The Court was confronted with the

issue of "whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose
arbitration clauses are 'silent' on that issue is consistent with the
[FAA]." 25 More specifically, the main issue was whether vacatur
of the arbitration award was appropriate because the arbitrators
"exceeded their powers" under the arbitration agreements. The
Court reasoned that the arbitrators violated section 10(a)(4) of the
FAA by deciding that class arbitration was permitted under
arbitration clauses that were silent to the issue of class arbitration
because of a public policy favoring arbitration.2 6 The court held
that vacatur of the arbitration award was appropriate.2 7
Stolt-Nielsen seems to signal the end of inferred class
arbitration, at least in a commercial, non-consumer setting. A
court cannot compel class arbitration without a contractual basis
for concluding that the parties agreed to it; and presumably no
potential defendant would agree to it. It is very unlikely that a
potential defendant would elect class arbitration because the
procedure combines the worst aspects of arbitration and litigation
- it is a high cost and high stakes process with an uncertain
preclusive effect on class members, lacks confidentiality (and
transparency), and imposes extreme limitations on the scope of
judicial review.
However, the dissent in Stolt-Nielsen suggested that the
majority opinion does not extend to situations where a consumer
has agreed to a class waiver in an adhesion contract. 28
Concepcion is a case currently before the Court that deals with
that very issue - class action waivers in a consumer contract
setting. 29 If the Court decides that class action waivers are
susceptible to state law unconscionability challenges, then
companies contracting with consumers may abandon arbitration
altogether. Stolt-Nielsen, therefore, may mean the end of class
arbitration, and Concepcion may mean the end of arbitration in
consumer settings.

25
16

Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1764.
See id. at 1776-78.

2

Id. at 1770.

24

28
2

See id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Laster,584 F.3d at 852-53.
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C. Class arbitration is not precluded by the FAA, but must be
shown to have been agreed upon by all parties
While the FAA allows class arbitration, 0 it still remains a
voluntary process that cannot be forced onto parties.- A party
will not be forced into class arbitration under the FAA absent a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to it.3 2
Whether an arbitration agreement is silent as to class arbitration
is an issue of contractual interpretation to be decided by an
arbitrator.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that agreements to arbitrate
are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."3 4
State law may be applied to determine if such grounds exist, but
only if such law applies to contracts generally, not just to
agreements to arbitrate.35
Because an arbitration clause is
severable from the rest of the contract as a matter of substantive
federal arbitration law, the entire contract is not automatically
struck down if the arbitration clause is found to be invalid. 6
This is true even where the container contract is itself an
arbitration agreement since "[a]pplication of the severability rule
does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the
contract.""
Therefore, an unconscionable class waiver is
Still, a court
severable from the rest of the arbitration clause.
will uphold an "arbitration provision [that] specifically provides
that if the class action waiver is found to be void, then the entire
arbitration provision is null and void."39

'o See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1773-75; Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 445-46 (2003); 1 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 16:1.
31 Volt Info. Scis. Inc., 489 U.S. at 479.
31 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
3 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 445.
3' Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §2 (2009).
"Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686.
3' Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445-46.
3 RentA-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010).
3' Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2003 WL 21530185, at *13 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 18, 2003).
3 Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 350 Fed. App'x. 108, 109 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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D. Seven years of confusion induced by lower courts' erroneous
interpretation of the Court ruling in Bazzle
Class arbitrations were uncommon before the Court's
decision in Bazzle.4 0 In Bazzle, homeowners obtained home
improvement loans from Green Tree Financial.4 ' The parties
entered into a contract, governed by South Carolina law, which
contained a broad arbitration clause.42 The contract also stated
that the FAA applied to the agreement.4 3 However, Green Tree
Financial failed to provide the borrowers a required form
informing them of their rights to counsel and insurance agents;
consequently, two sets of borrowers brought separate actions in
South Carolina state court.4 4
Ultimately, two classes were certified and compelled
arbitration proceedings before the same arbitrator, who found for
the class in both cases. After Green Tree Financial appealed the
arbitrator's rulings, the South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew
both cases from the Court of Appeals and held that the contracts
were silent as to class proceedings, that they allowed class
proceedings, and that the arbitrations had properly assumed that
form.45
The issue for the court in Bazzle was whether the South
Carolina Supreme Court's holding was consistent with the
FAA.46 The Supreme Court plurality found that the holding was
inconsistent with the FAA and vacated and remanded the case
for an arbitrator to ' decide the question of contractual
interpretation .47 The Court reasoned that, by the terms of the
parties' contracts, the question of whether the agreement allows
or prohibits class arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide.48
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.4.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447. .

40

41

42 Id.

at 448. " . . . [all disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or

relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract . .
shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with
the consent of you." Id.
" See id. at 455.
44
4

Id. at 448.
at.450.

1Id.

See id. at 450-51.
47 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454.
48 "In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties
intended courts, not arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related
matter (in the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence to the contrary).
These limited instances typically involve matters of a kind that contracting
46
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Several courts read Bazzle narrowly, concluding that it
had no precedential value whatsoever.49 Other courts took a
different view of Bazzle - namely that the ruling clearly placed
with the arbitrator the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate
allows for class arbitration.s The Fifth Circuit, for example,
decided that Bazzle created a precedent requiring an arbitrator,
rather than a court, to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate
The use of class arbitration
allows for class arbitration."
accelerated following Bazzle. In Stolt-Nielsen, however, the
court revisited Bazzle, perhaps to reverse that trend.
E. Stolt-Nielsen - The Court takes a sharp tack and class
arbitration changes course
1. Proceeding in the courts below
AnimalFeeds and Stolt-Nielsen were parties to parcel
tanker shipping services contracts with broad arbitration
clauses.s* AnirnalFeeds alleged that Stolt-Nielsen violated federal
antitrust laws by engaging in an effort to restrain competition
and corner the world market for parcel tanker shipping services."
The parties agreed that the arbitrators would follow and
be bound by Rules 3 through 7 of the American Arbitration
parties would likely have expected a court to decide. They include certain
gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration
agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to
a certain type of controversy... The question here - of whether the contracts
forbid class arbitration - does not fall into this narrow exception." Id. at 452
(internal citations omitted).
49 See, e.g., Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem. Co., 443
F.3d 573, 579-82 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that Bazzle has no precedential
value because no single rationale was endorsed by a majority).
so "In the absence of a class action waiver, California law authorizes
classwide arbitrations and vests jurisdiction in our trial courts to determine
whether in a particular case that approach offer[s] a better, more efficient, and
fairer solution than the alternatives. Until last year, we applied these rules to
arbitrations governed by the Federal Arbitration Act-but no longer. The
Supreme Court has spoken, and the foundational issue-whether a particular
arbitration agreement prohibits class arbitrations-must (in FAA cases)
henceforth be decided by the arbitrators, not the courts." Garcia v. DIRECTV,
Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 297, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) referring to Bazzle, 539
U.S. at 451 (citations omitted).
s1 Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefits Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex.,
Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 358-63 (5th Cir. 2003).
52 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1764-65.
s3 See id. at 1765.
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Association's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations.54 Rule
3 provides that the arbitrator decides whether the arbitration
clause allows for class arbitration in a particular instance.ss The
arbitration panel looked at the relevant arbitration clauses and
determined that they were silent as to the issue of class
arbitration." AnimalFeeds and its co-plaintiffs argued that the
class arbitration could-and should-proceed, citing Rule 3 and
public policy in addition to claiming the contracts would
otherwise be unconscionable.
Stolt-Nielsen argued that the
silence meant the parties did not intend to allow for class
arbitration, citing cases and arbitration decisions and purporting
to distinguish decisions cited by AnimalFeeds. 8 Stolt-Nielsen
contended that those decisions were distinguishable because they
were not international maritime agreements where parties expect
bilateral instead of class arbitration as a matter of custom and
usage.s9
The arbitration panel issued a clause construction award,
concluding that the agreements and the arbitration clauses
allowed for class arbitration.o It based the award, in part, on
twenty-one other clause construction awards that reached the
same conclusion in similar circumstances, though none dealt with
international maritime contracts.6 1 Stolt-Nielsen petitioned the
district court to vacate the panel's award, which it did on
grounds of manifest disregard for the law. 62 The court reasoned
that the panel failed to do a choice-of-law analysis, which would
have revealed that the dispute was governed by federal maritime
law controlled by custom and usage, and agreed with StoltNielsen's assertion that maritime arbitration clauses never allow
54 Id. See also American Arbitration Ass'n, Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations (2003), available at http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (last visited
Mar. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Supplementary Rules].
ss Supplementary Rules, supra note 54. These Supplementary Rules were
promulgated in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Bazzle, 539 U.S. at
444.
56 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
17 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir.
2008) rev'd Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758.
58
Id.
59
Id.
6
old. Consistent with the process established by the Supplemental Rules,
the panel merely decided that the contracts allowed for class arbitration. It did
not certify a class or otherwise proceed with class arbitration. See id.
6 Id.
62

at 89-90.

Id. at 90.
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class arbitration.63
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the high bar for
manifest disregard for the law was not met.64 Manifest disregard
of the law requires that the arbitrators: (1) knew of the valid legal
principle; (2) appreciated that this principle controlled the
outcome of the. disputed issue; and (3) nonetheless willfully
flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.6 s The
subjective third prong only applies to sources cited and brought
to the arbitrator's attention by the parties.66
2. The Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a party may
not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party
agreed to do so."167 AnimalFeeds had argued that the panel should
allow class arbitration because: (1) the clause does not preclude it,
and it is allowed under Bazzle; (2) public policy favors such an
outcome; and (3) the clause would otherwise be unconscionable
were it to preclude class proceedings. 68 The Court decided that
the arbitrators' award was based entirely on public policy
considerations.69
The Court held that the arbitration panel exceeded its
powers by basing its award on public policy,o noting that "[i]t is
only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and
application of the agreement and effectively dispense[s] his own
brand of industrial justice that his decision may be
unenforceable."n The Court further noted that the parties had
stipulated to the arbitration panel that the arbitration clauses
were "silent" as to class arbitration, and that "silence" meant that
there was no agreement as to that issue by the parties.72 The
panel, however, looked to other arbitration decisions - without
6 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 38587 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
64 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1766.
68 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 435 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
66 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 548 F.3d at 93.
67 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
68 Id. at 1768.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1770.
n Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1767 (quoting Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n., 532 U.S. at 509) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id. at 1766.
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analyzing whether those decisions were based on the FAA, New
York law, or maritime law - and then purported to fashion a
rule that it thought was the best outcome given the particular
situation." In doing so, the Court held, the panel exceeded its
authority under the arbitration agreement.74 Therefore, the Court
found that section 10(b) of the FAA required it to either direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators or decide the question that was posed
to the arbitration panel." The Court reasoned that, because only
one outcome was possible, no rehearing was necessary.16
More significantly, the Court said that the arbitration
panel -

and the parties themselves -

incorrectly interpreted

77

Bazzle as controlling precedent. The parties had proceeded as if
Bazzle required an arbitrator to decide whether a contract
permitted class arbitration.78
However, the Supreme Court
disabused them of that notion and pointed out that the Court did
not reach a consensus in Bazzle. 79 A plurality of the court decided
only that an arbitrator, not a court, decides whether an
arbitration agreement is silent as to class arbitration." The Court
stated that Bazzle did not create a rule for deciding whether an
arbitration contract permits class arbitration."
3. Following Stolt-Nielsen; use of class arbitration to resolve
multiple disputes is not a given - class arbitration must be
agreed to by all of the parties
The Supreme Court's reading of Bazzle is narrow but
sound. Some courts read Bazzle to espouse the rule that whether
an arbitration agreement - silent as to the issue of class
arbitration allows for class arbitration is a matter of
contractual interpretation for the arbitrator and not a court.8 2
The Supreme Court has said, however, that parties who have
interpreted Bazzle in such a manner were apparently "baffled" by
7

Id. at 1768-69.

74Id.

Id. at 1770.
Id.
" Id.
7

76

78 Id. at 1772 (noting that Bazzle did not reach a majority decision on any
of the three questions before the court).

7 Id.
80

Id. at 1771.

81 Id.
82 See

e.g., Garcia, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 298 (citing Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451);
OF ACTION 2d 203 (2010).

See also 28 CAUSES
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the decision."
The Supreme Court's treatment of its decision in Bazzle
was the main focus of Stolt-Nielsen. Before Stolt-Nielsen it
seemed that the Court would have to handle Bazzle carefully if it
decided to reverse the Second Circuit. But the Court opted for
force over finesse in its treatment of Bazzle. The Court has now
said that Bazzle means that the issue of whether an arbitration
agreement is silent as to class arbitration is a matter of
contractual interpretation for the arbitrator, and that is the extent
of the ruling. The Court in Stolt-Nielsen addressed the next
question: Can an arbitrator decide that an arbitration agreement
that is silent as to class arbitration nonetheless allows for it? The
short answer is that an arbitrator cannot order a party to proceed
with class arbitration unless there is some evidence in the
contract that all of the parties have agreed to class arbitration.
III. The Fall-outfrom Stolt-Nielsen - Consumer Class Action
Waivers, Unconscionability,and the FAA
A. State courts' unconscionability determination and the impact
on waivers of class arbitration
Numerous courts have heard arguments that class
arbitration waivers are unconscionable in a consumer setting, at
least in circumstances where potential plaintiffs would be unable
to vindicate their rights - or would not be sufficiently
incentivized to do so - were it not for the class mechanism. 84
Often these cases arise in circumstances where the underlying
contracts are uniform agreements styled as contracts of adhesion.
There are approximately two hundred appellate court decisions
that have dealt with this issue.s The cases most in contention
involve no-value (or cost-preclusive) consumer claims. These are
instances in which a complainant's potential recovery is less than
his costs of bringing a claim. Some states, led by California, have
invalidated class arbitration waivers in these circumstances as
unconscionable because the class arbitration waivers are
characterized as exculpatory clauses.86
States' unconscionability laws are not uniform. Most
states recognize a distinction between procedural and substantive
" Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1772.
See generally, 13 A.L.R. 6th 145 (listing cases).
85 Id.
6 See e.g., Laster, 584 F.3d at 853-57.
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unconscionability that appears to have its derivation in one law
review article." Procedural unconscionability means that the
bargaining was one-sided and thus unfair to a party, whereas
substantive unconscionability means that the terms of the
contract, in whole or in part, are one-sided and unfair.88 While
almost all states have adopted this distinction, courts are split as
to whether a plaintiff has to show both procedural and
substantive unconscionability in order to invalidate an
arbitration agreement." Most courts require both;90 however,
some courts have held that .either one alone can be enough or that
substantive unconscionability is enough standing alone.9 1
See generally, Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The
Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
88 See e.g., Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th
1224, 1245 (Cal. 2007).
89 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed.).
90 21 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:15; BlueCross BlueShield of Ala. v.
Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1087 (Ala. 2005); Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (sliding scale); Voice Stream
Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Comms. Inc., 912 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(sliding scale); Nec Tech. Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 773 n.6 (Ga. 1996);
Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 882 (Idaho 2003); In re
Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Iowa 2008); Freedman v. Comcast
Corp., 998 A.2d 68, 85 (Md. App. 2010); Liparoto Const., Inc. v. General Shale
Brick, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Mich. App. 2009); Woods v. QC Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Mo. App. 2008) (sliding scale); Myers v. Nebraska Inv.
Council, 724 N.W.2d 776 (Neb. 2006); D.R. Horton v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159,
1162 (Nev. 2004) (sliding scale); Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d
915, 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); Tillman v. Comm. Credit Loans, Inc.,
655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008); Praus v. Praus, 786 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D.
2010); Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Ohio 2009); Wittmer v.
Exxon Corp., 434 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Pa. 1981); In re Turner Bros. Trucking Co.,
Inc., 8 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. App. 1999); Cottonwood Fin., Ltd. v. Estes, 784
N.W.2d 735, 726 (Wis. App. 2010); Williams v. Walkier-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445, 446-48 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
91 Helstrom v. North Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1200 (Alaska 1990)
(using a sliding scale and holding substantive is enough); Maxwell v. Fidelity
Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (holding substantive is enough);
Hottle v. BDO Seidman LLP, 846 A.2d 862, 879 (Conn. 2004) (using a sliding
scale and holding substantive is enough); Frank's Maint. & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A.
Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 409-410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding either one is
enough); Remco Enterprises, Inc., v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567, 572 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding either one is enough); Buhrer v. BDO Seidman, LLP, No.
022190C, 2003 WL 22049503, at *2 (Super. Ct. Mass. 2003) (using a sliding
scale and substantive enough); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534
N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988) (holding substantive is enough);
Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 948 (Or. Ct. App.
87
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For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that a class action
waiver in an arbitration agreement embedded in a consumer
contract of adhesion, which involves predictably low dollar
amounts of damages, is unconscionable because the consumer
needs the class procedure to vindicate his or her rights.92 The
Illinois Supreme Court has held that provisions in arbitration
agreements that purport to waive a party's right to bring a class
proceeding in arbitration are substantively unconscionable in
small value consumer contract claims.93
In Kinkel, the plaintiff tried to bring a class action against
Cingular, her cellular phone service provider.9 4 She alleged that
Cingular charged an illegal fee for early termination.s Cingular
moved to compel arbitration under the parties' arbitration
agreement, which stated that the arbitrator could not hear class
disputes. 96 The appellate court held that the class action. waiver
was unconscionable but severable from the rest of the arbitration
The Illinois Supreme Court
clause, which was enforceable."
preemption argument
conflict
Cingular's
affirmed." In rejecting
- namely that Section 2 of the FAA preempted any state statute
that would not allow for class action waiver - the Illinois
Supreme Court said that when state courts are applying state law
to a question of enforceability of a particular contract, they are
not required by the FAA "to necessarily reach an outcome that
encourages individual arbitration. Further, class arbitration
cannot be in conflict with the FAA when the Supreme Court has

2007) (holding substantive is enough); Vintage Health Resources, Inc. v.
Guiangan, 309 S.W.3d 448, 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding either one is
enough); Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d
1028, 1043 (Utah 1985) (holding either one is enough); Tjart v. Smith Barney,
Inc., 28 P.3d 823, 830 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding either one is enough);
Arnold v. United Companies Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va.
1998) (holding substantive is enough).
9 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc. 498 F.3d 976, 993 (9th
Cir. 2007); but see Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp 2d. 1263, 1270
(C.D. Cal 2008) (holding class action waiver in arbitration agreement not
unconscionable where the contract was not a contract of adhesion and gave
the consumer 60 days to opt out).
" Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill. 2006).
94 Id. at 254.
9s

Id.

Id.
" Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 823 (111. App. Ct.
2005).
98Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 250.
96
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recognized the arbitrability of class claims.""
On balance, this entire body of case law may become a
legal curiosity in light of the Court's holding in Stolt-Nielsen.
Even if litigants "win" a judgment invalidating a class waiver as
unconscionable, the class waiver is severable from the rest of the
arbitration contract, thereby leaving an arbitration agreement, at
best, silent as to class proceedings.oo Stolt-Nielsen did not create
an exception that would allow a court to compel arbitration that
utilizes the class mechanism without a contractual basis showing
that the parties agreed to it, even where that court held an
applicable class waiver unconscionable. Stolt-Nielsen necessarily
means that a defendant cannot be compelled to proceed with
class arbitration where the agreement contains a specific waiver
of class arbitration.
However, not all courts have found class arbitration
agreements unconscionable. In Jenkins, the Eleventh Circuit
held that agreements between a cash advance business and its
borrower customer were valid under the FAA, even though the
agreement provided that the customer waived his right to a class
action and agreed to arbitrate any dispute arising from the payday loans."0 ' Also, the Fourth Circuit will enforce contracts,
including waiver of a jury and class claims, even when it would
lead to a consumer's inability to proceed with a case because her
individual claim is too small. 0 2 The Third and Seventh Circuits
also follow this approach.'0
B. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC'04
In Laster, the Concepcions were. customers of AT&T
Mobility LLC ("ATTM")'0 who purchased cellular phones and
cellular phone service as a bundled transaction pursuant to a
" Id. at 262 (citing Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 444).
1 This assumes that a "blow-out clause" is not in place.
1oJenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 875
(11th Cir. 2005) (reversing the lower court decision and remanding for an
arbitrator to decide whether the underlying lending contracts were void ab
initio). See id. at 883.
102Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir.
2002).
103 See Johnson v. Western Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d at 366, 369 (3d Cir.
2000); Livingston v. Assoc. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003).
'" Laster, 584 F.3d at 849.

'0 Actually, the Concepcions were customers of Cingular, but AT&T
acquired Cingular Wireless in 2007, renaming it AT&T Mobility.
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written contract. 0 6 ATTM said that the phones were free to
In accordance with
people who signed up for service."o'
California law, ATTM charged the Concepcions sales tax on the
retail value of the two phones, totaling $30.22.10 The contract
provided that all claims be submitted to arbitration, and it barred
In addition, the contract allowed
class claims in arbitration.'
court.110
claims
small
sue
in
to
party
either
On March 27, 2006, the Concepcions sued ATTM,
alleging fraud."' The District Court for the Southern District of
California consolidated their case with a putative class action
covering the same issues, the Laster case."' In December 2006,
ATTM added a "premium payment" clause to its arbitration
agreement." 3 This clause provided that, in the event that an
arbitrator issues an award in the customer's favor that is greater
than ATTM's last written settlement offer prior to arbitrator
selection, ATTM would pay any customer an amount equal to
the value of the maximum claim .that may be brought in small
claims court in the county of the customer's billing address." 4 In
March 2008, ATTM moved to compel arbitration."' The district
court denied the motion, holding that the class waiver was
unconscionable under California law, which was not preempted
by the FAA."6 The Ninth Circuit upheld that decision."'
Under California's unconscionability law, a provision is
unenforceable only if it is both procedurally and substantively
California law provides that procedural
unconscionable."s
unconscionability generally arises in uniform contracts, which are
Laster, 584 F.3d at 852.
Id.
for Petitioner-Appellant at 9, AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Los Brief
Concepcion, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL
3017755, at *9 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner-Appellant] ("California requires
that sales tax be paid on the full retail value of a phone when it is sold as part
of a bundled transaction.") (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, §§ 1585(a)(4),
(b)(3)).
1o9 Id. at 852-53.
110 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS, 2008 WL 5216255,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
"' Id. at 853.
106
107

112

Id.

"13Id.
114

Id.

Id.
Id.
117 Id. at 852.
11

116

11' Id. at 853.
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characterized as adhesion contracts, whereas substantive
unconscionability arises when there are harsh, one-sided terms."'
California
uses
a
"sliding-scale"
approach
towards
unenforceability,
which
allows
for
less
procedural
unconscionability in a contract where there is more substantive
20
unconscionability, and vice versa.1
In Discover Bank,' 2' the California Supreme Court
developed what has been interpreted as a "three-part test" to
determine whether a class action waiver in a consumer contract is
unconscionable: (1) whether the agreement is a contract of
adhesion; (2) whether the disputes between the contracting
parties likely involve small amounts of damages; and (3) whether
it is alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme deliberately to cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money.122 The
Discover Bank rule is grounded in a California exculpatory clause
statute, which states that "contracts which have for their object,
directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud ... are against the policy of the law.""' A party does

not need to prove all three elements to prevail. 2 4 However, the
Ninth Circuit held that all three were present in this case.'25
The. Ninth Circuit also rejected ATTM's argument that
the premium payment sanitized the class waiver provision.12 6
ATTM asserted that its contract and agreement to arbitrate are
not aimed at disputes with predictably small amounts of
damages, as required by Discover Bank, because ATTM has
itself provided for larger recoveries with its premium payment
clause.'27
Here, ATTM contended that a $7,500 premium payment
(where - plaintiffs only claimed $30.22 in actual damages)
sufficiently incentivized would-be* plaintiffs to bring claims and
sufficiently deterred ATTM from engaging in wrongful

"1 Id.
120

Id.

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2008).
Laster, 584 F.3d at 854 (citing Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 983).
113 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2010).
124 Laster, 584 F.3d at 854 (noting that there are circumstances
where a
provision is unconscionable even without meeting all three requirements).
125 Id.
' 61 d. at 855.
127 Id.
121
122
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The court disagreed, stating that "the premium
conduct.'
payment provision does not transform a $30.22 case into a
predictable $7,500 case." 129 The court predicted ATTM would
simply pay the face value of the customer claim, rather than
contesting it and risking $7,500.130 Thus, the court reasoned that
ATTM could cheat numerous customers out of small sums while
keeping its liability to a minimum.
The court went on to state that the provision essentially
"guarantee[s] that the company will make any aggrieved
customer whole who files a claim. Although this is, in and of
itself, a good thing, the problem with it under California law-as
we read that law-is that not every aggrieved customer will file a
claim.""' The Ninth Circuit determined that the FAA did not
preempt California unconscionability law relating to class
arbitration waivers in consumer adhesion contracts.13 2
The Ninth Circuit also held that the FAA does not
expressly preempt California unconscionability law related to
class waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion.1 3 The FAA
expressly preempts state laws that allow for a revocation of an
arbitration agreement but does not allow for a revocation of a
contract generally. 134 ATTM argued that Discover Bank created
a new rule that does not apply to contracts generally, but instead
targets arbitration clauses for invalidation.' The court rejected
that argument, stating that Discover Bank was simply a
to
approach
sliding-scale
of California's
refinement
unconscionability law, the difference being that Discover Bank
The
applied the sliding-scale in the class waiver setting.3
Discover Bank rule states, "if a contract clause is, in practice,
exculpatory, as long as there is any degree of procedural
unconscionability, the element of substantive unconscionability is
generally adequate, as a matter of law.""' In Shroyer, the court
had previously rejected the argument that Discover Bank exposes
arbitration agreements to special scrutiny."
128

Id.

129

Id.

13
131

Id. at 856.

Id. at 856 n.9.

132 Id. at 856-59.

13s

Id. at 857.
Id.
Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.
Id. (citing Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 987).

11
134

131
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The court also stated that the FAA did not impliedly
preempt California unconscionability law.139 The purposes of .the
FAA are two-fold: "to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements by placing them on the same footing as any other
contract, and second, to promote the efficient and expeditious
resolution of claims."140
The court stated that California
unconscionability law does not offend either of these purposes. 14 1
Lastly, ATTM argued that the Supreme Court's decision
in Preston4 2 superseded Shroyer, but the court rejected this
argument as well. The court distinguished Preston from the case
before it on the grounds that Preston involved a challenge to the
contract's validity as a whole, whereas this challenge was specific
to the arbitration clause.'4 3
C. The Supreme Court confronts the issues in Concepcion
1. ATTM's Argument

44

ATTM argued before the Court that the FAA preempts

California's DiscoverBank4 rule. 461 The main policy of the FAA
is to ensure that agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to
their terms. Congress enacted the FAA to overcome the very
judicial hostility to arbitration that is inherent in California's
purported rule of unconscionability law that applies to
arbitration agreements alone.
ATTM, as Petitioner, argued that the FAA allows for
invalidation of arbitration agreements on limited grounds.147
Section 2 of the FAA provides that an arbitration agreement may
be revoked on grounds that exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.148 Petitioner also argued that, because
California's rule only applies to arbitration agreements, the rule
is not one for the revocation of any contract.149
Further,
Petitioner notes that the terms of this arbitration agreement are
139

Id.

140

Id. .

Id.

141

Preston, 552 U.S. at 346.
143 Laster 584 F.3d at 859.
114 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 108.
145 Discover Bank, 113
P.3d at 1103.
146 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 108,
at 2.
1' Id. at 15-16.
14' Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
149 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 108, at 17.
142
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fair.1 s0 Indeed, with the exception of a class proceeding, the
arbitration agreement provides just about every conceivable
consumer-friendly dispute amenity.'
Petitioner asserted that if the Ninth Circuit's decision in
this case were upheld, it would signify the end of arbitration of
consumer disputes in California.152 Class arbitration combines.
the worst elements of arbitration and litigation to form a process
that no business would enter voluntarily - it is a high cost and
high stakes process leading to an award with uncertain preclusive
effect on class members and subject to extreme limitations on
If the price of having an arbitration agreement
review.15
includes the possibility of being dragged into class arbitrations,
companies will likely abandon arbitration.154
2. The Concepcions' argument 55
The Concepcions' core argument is that the FAA does not
preempt the California rule of unconscionability that invalidated
the class waiver provision because California's unconscionability
law is, under Section 2, a ground for the revocation of any
contract and does not discriminate against arbitration
agreements.' Courts have applied the general contract law of at
least twenty states to invalidate class waivers in arbitration
contracts."'5 The Concepcions also argue that the California rule
applies outside the context of arbitration."' In fact, the first
California appellate decision dealing with unconscionability of

'o

Id. at 19.

The arbitration agreement provides that ATTM pays all arbitration
fees of the customer for non-frivolous claims; the arbitration venue is designed
for the customer's convenience; a customer can choose to bring a claim in
small claims court; full remedies are available in arbitration; there is no
confidentiality requirement; if the arbitrator awards an amount to the
customer exceeding ATTM's last written settlement offer, then the customer is
guaranteed at least $7,500 and double attorney's fees; and ATTM will never
seek attorney's fees even when entitled to do so. See id. at 5-7.
152 See id. at 56.
" See id. at 53-55.
1

154

See id. at 55-56.

Brief for Respondents-Appellees, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 4411292
[hereinafter Brief for Respondents-Appellees].
"6 Id. at 12.
"' Id. at 18.
58
1
See id. at 21.
15s
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class waivers was America Online'5 9 - a case that did not
involve arbitration.1 6 0
In America Online, the court determined that the
California consumer protection law' 6 ' allowed for class actions,
but that the comparable Virginia law 62 did not.' 6 Further, the
court held that class actions are of great importance in California
law, and that the lack of access to the class mechanism was
enough to render unenforceable the forum selection clause in the
America Online Terms of Service Agreement.16 4
Respondents also noted that the amount of consumers
actually using this allegedly pro-consumer arbitration process is
very low, despite the fact that AT&T has the worst customer
satisfaction rating in an industry that generates more consumer
complaints than any other.
IV. Was the Ninth Circuit Decision in Accord With Supreme
Court Precedent Priorto Stolt-Nielsen?
A. Is there a special rule for consumer contracts?
The Court in Stolt-Nielsen held that an arbitration clause
that is silent as to the issue of class arbitration is precluded in the
absence of any contractual evidence of the parties' intent to allow
for class arbitration.'6 5 The Court has stated that any arbitration

's America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001). Former subscribers of America Online ("AOL") filed a class action
against the company, alleging that AOL improperly debited their credit cards
for monthly service fees after the class members had terminated their
The Terms of Service Agreement ("TOS") between the
subscriptions.
subscribers and AOL designated Virginia courts as the exclusive venue and
Virginia law as applicable law for any dispute. The class alleged that the TOS
was unenforceable as an unconscionable contract of adhesion. The America
Online court stated that California law "favors forum selection agreements
only so long as they are procured freely and voluntarily, with the place chosen
having some logical nexus to one of the parties or the dispute, and so long as
California consumers will not find their substantial legal rights significantly
impaired by their enforcement. Therefore, to be enforceable, the selected
jurisdiction must be 'suitable,.' 'available,' and able to 'accomplish substantial
justice."' Id. at 707.
1" See Brief for Respondents-Appellees, supra note 155, at 22.
161CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1752, 1781 (West 2010).
t62 VA. CODE ANN., § 59.1-203 (West 2008).
163America Online, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710-12.

'" Id. at 712.
161

Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1777.
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contract that does not speak to class arbitration contains an
implied waiver of the ability of a party to avail itself of the class
mechanism because the contract does not contain evidence of the
parties' intent to allow for it. Moreover, where the agreement
contains a specific waiver, there is no plausible argument that the
parties agreed to class arbitration.
However, should there be a special rule that governs
consumer arbitration? Can consumers say that this rule cannot
apply to them because they have a compelling reason, i.e., they
are consumers dealing with sophisticated companies and are
compelled to accept contracts of adhesion? Moreover, because
only small damage claims may accrue to businesses that deal with
consumers, the only practical recourse available to consumers is
through a class proceeding. Ultimately, the argument is reduced
to the proposition that unless companies agree to class
arbitration, no arbitration process can be used in a consumer
setting.
The Court, however, has spoken on this issue:
§2 gives States a method for protecting consumers
against unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an
unwanted arbitration provision. States may regulate
contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general
contract law principles and they may invalidate an
arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §
2 (emphasis added). What States may not do is decide
that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic
terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to
enforce its arbitration clause. The Act makes any such
state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would
place arbitration clauses on an unequal "footing,"
directly contrary. to the Act's language and Congress'
intent.'66
B. Does Preston forecast a possible outcome?
In Preston, the Court held that "when parties agree to
arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws lodging
primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or
administrative, are superseded by the FAA." 6 ' A broader
66 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc., 513 U.S. at 281.
167Preston, 552 U.S. at 349-350.
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reading of Preston is that the FAA preempts a state law that
undermines a primary objective of an arbitration agreement such
as "'achieving streamlined proceedings and expeditious
results. "168
69
an attorney, Preston, contracted to represent
In Preston,1
Ferrer, an entertainer, in some capacity.o7 0 The contract to render
services contained an arbitration clause, specifying American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") rules.'71 Preston later demanded
arbitration over unpaid fees, and Ferrer petitioned the California
Labor Commissioner ("CLC") to declare their contract void on
grounds that Preston had been acting.as a talent agent without a
license.7 2 The CLC's officer denied the motion on grounds that
the CLC did not have the authority to grant the relief sought. 7 1
Ferrer filed in state court, seeking a declaration that the dispute
as to the validity of the contract was not subject to arbitration. 74
Ferrer moved for an injunction to stop arbitration proceedings.',s
Preston moved to compel arbitration.' 6
The superior court denied Preston's motion and enjoined
Preston from proceeding with arbitration unless and until the
Labor Commissioner determined she did not have jurisdiction."'
While Preston's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court's
decision in Buckeye came down, holding that "challenges to the
validity of a contract providing for arbitration ordinarily 'should
... be considered by an arbitrator, not a court. ""
The California appeals court affirmed, holding that the
California Talent Agencies Act"'7 ("TAA") vested exclusive
jurisdiction in the Labor Commissioner, and that Buckeye was
inapplicable because it did not involve an administrative agency
with exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. 80 The California
Supreme Court denied review.'"' The United States Supreme

Id. at 35 7-58 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 614, 633).

16

161 Id. at 350.
70

o Id.

71

Id.

Id.
17Id.
172

inId.

17s

76

'

Id. at 351.

Id.

Id.
Id. (quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 446).
' CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
x"Preston,552 U.S. at 351.
177
171

181

Id.
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Court, however, granted certiorari "to determine whether the
FAA overrides a state law vesting initial adjudicatory authority
in an administrative agency."18
Ferrer claimed Preston acted as his talent agent without a
license, thereby making the contract void and entitling Preston to
no compensation."' Conversely, Preston argued that he acted as
a personal manager, not a talent agent, and that the contract was
valid, fees were due, and the TAA did not apply. 1 84 Preston
contended that Ferrer had to argue his TAA defense in
arbitration.8 ' Ferrer insisted that, under California law, the
proceeding was within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Commissioner. 8 6
The Court stated, however, that ."[t]he
dispositive issue . . . contrary to Ferrer's suggestion, is not

whether the FAA preempts the TAA wholesale. The FAA plainly
has no such destructive aim or effect. Instead, the question is
simply who decides whether Preston acted as a personal manager
or as talent agent.""'
The Court noted that, as it held in Southland, the national
policy favoring arbitration of claims where parties have agreed to
arbitrate applies in both, state and federal courts, and blocks
state legislatures from undermining arbitration agreements.18 8
The FAA displaces state law to the contrary.'8 9 The question
arises: Who decides whether grounds exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract? An arbitrator will address this
issue when the challenge is to the contract as a whole, while a
court will address the issue when the challenge is to the
arbitration clause alone. 90 The rule applies in state court too,' 9 '
despite its federal court origins."' The Court adhered to Buckeye
and determined that the decision is one for an arbitrator to decide
because the contract was within Section 2 and because Ferrer
challenged the validity of the whole contract.'
2 Id. at 351-52.
83

1

Id. at 352.

1 Id.

Id.
Id.
187 Id. (citation omitted).
188 Id. at 353.
185
186

189 Id.
o90
Id.

' Preston,552 U.S. at 353. (citing Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 447-48).
1
See Prima Paint Corp. v, Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 40304 (1967).
'9 Id. at 354.
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The Court further noted that that the TAA's procedural
prescriptions conflicted with the FAA's dispute resolution in two
ways: "First, the TAA .. . grants the Labor Commissioner

exclusive jurisdiction to decide an issue that the parties agreed to
arbitrate;

second,

the

TAA

. . . imposes

prerequisites

to

enforcement of an arbitration agreement that are not applicable
to contracts generally."l 94
The Court rejected Ferrer's contention that arbitration
would be merely postponed under TAA guidelines, thus making
the TAA compatible with the FAA. 9 s The Court reasoned that if
arbitration occurred at all, it "would likely be long delayed, in
contravention of Congress' intent 'to move the parties to an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and
easily as possible."" 96 The Court noted that "[a] prime objective
of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve 'streamlined
proceedings and expeditious results."" 97
Ferrer contended that allowing parties to proceed directly
to arbitration would undermine the Labor Commissioner's ability
to stay informed of potentially illegal activity and would deprive
artists who are protected by the TAA of the Labor
Commissioner's expertise.'" The Court, however, noted that the
involvement of an agency does not limit parties' ability to
contract for arbitration, and administrative agencies can still
prosecute companies in their own name. 1
The Court in Preston concluded that the underlying issue
was merely a question concerning the proper forum in which the
parties' dispute would be heard.2 00 Preston did not give up any
substantive statutory rights by submitting his dispute to
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement that he
signed.2 01 The Court disapproved of Ferrer's distinction between
judicial and administrative proceedings that was adopted by the
appeals court.2 02 The Court stated that "[w]hen parties agree to
arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the FAA
Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
at 358.
116 Id. (quotingMoses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22).
"' Id. at 357 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 633; AlliedBruce Terminix Cos., Inc., 513 U.S. at 278; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 7).
"' Id. at 358.
"
9

1 1 Id.

19 Id.
2

" Id. at 359.

201

202

Id.
Id.
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supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another
forum, whether judicial or administrative." 203
Preston could be read to denote that the FAA preempts
any state law that would frustrate a major purpose of arbitration
contracts - speedy dispute resolution. This is the essential
argument Petitioner makes in Concepcion. More significantly, in
Preston, the Court does not defer to important California public
policy considerations when those public policy considerations
come into conflict with the FAA.
V. Does the Court's Action in American Express Merchants'
Litigation Suggest an Outcome?
American Express Merchants' Litigation is a commercial
class action antitrust case brought by credit card merchants."
The agreement between American Express and the plaintiff
merchants contained an arbitration provision and a class action
waiver.2 05 In American Express, the plaintiffs showed that the
median damages available under the Clayton Act for individual
class members was a modest $1,751.206 Plaintiffs also presented
evidence that antitrust cases require extensive expert analysis
costing anywhere from three hundred thousand dollars to in
excess of one million dollars. 20 7 Plaintiffs further *showed that
expert fees were not recoverable under the Clayton Act, and that
the arbitration agreement in question did not provide for the
recovery of such fees. 208 The Second Circuit concluded that,
given the low value of individual class members' potential
recovery and the unrecoverable expert fees, individual claims
were, as a practical matter, precluded.2 09 Based on these facts,
the Second Circuit ruled that the class action waiver was
unenforceable because it effectively served "to grant Amex de
facto immunity from antitrust liability."2 10 The court stated:
[W]e stress that we do not hold here that class action
203

Id.

In Re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2009), vacated and remanded sub nom., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
201 Id. at 305.
20

20 6
20 7

Id. at 317.
Id. at 316.

See id. at 317-18.
See id. at 320. 209 See also, generally, Handbook on ArbitrationPractice,
American Arbitration Association 2010, at 155.
210 Id. at 320.
208
201
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waivers in arbitration agreements are per se
unenforceable. We also do not hold that they are per se
unenforceable in the context of antitrust actions.
Rather, we hold that each case which presents a
question of enforceability of a class action waiver in an
arbitration agreement must be considered on its own
merits, governed with a healthy regard for the fact that
the FAA 'is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreement.' 2 1 1
In May 2009 American Express filed a certiorari petition
in the American Express Merchants' Litigation. On May 3, 2010
the Court issued a summary order in American Express Co. v.
2 12
granting certiorari, summarily
Italian Colors Restaurant,
vacating the Second Circuit judgment, and remanding it "for
further consideration in light of" Stolt-Nielsen.2 13 It is unclear
why the Court vacated the judgment. Perhaps the Court
believed the waiver was, in fact, enforceable or perhaps there was
some other unexplained reason related to the Court's decision in
S tolt-Nielsen.
VI. Conclusion
It is always dangerous to predict how the Court will
decide any particular matter. However, in Concepcion, there is
ample Supreme Court jurisprudence supporting the validation of
the ATTM arbitration agreement, including the class action
waiver. Moreover, it can be argued that consumers would not
benefit from a decision that precludes them from agreeing to
arbitration and contracting away the right to institute class
proceedings. Class actions - be they in court or in front of an
arbitrator - do not routinely vindicate the rights of members of
the class in an effective manner. Certainly, arbitration panels are
free to certify classes that would raise the cost of doing business
for those companies that deal with large numbers of consumers,
who would subsequently pass that cost on to all consumers.
American business, while far from pristine in its approach
to doing business with consumers, has improved its performance
significantly. In Concepcion, the ATTM agreement is very fair to

21 Id.
212

at 321.

130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (summary disposition).
213 See id.
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the individual consumer, as indicated by the Ninth Circuit.2 14
Moreover, it has been noted that terms in consumer contracts
have recently shifted from those that favor the business-such as
those that prohibit punitive damages and attorneys' fees, require
arbitration to proceed in a remote location, require the consumer
to pay half or all of the arbitration fees, or give the company the
sole authority to select the arbitrator-to those terms that fall
under the guiding principle of "fairness to the consumer."2 15
While it is accurate to acknowledge that consumer class
actions complement government efforts against bad business
practices, it may not make sense to make such a policy evergreen
when fairness for the individual consumer is achieved.
Ultimately, giving arbitration the opportunity to show that it has
significant potential advantages in resolving consumer disputes
may make for sound long-term policy.

F.3d at 856 n.9.
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